Reasoning about knowledge
Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-ValueAuctions
Computational Economics
UAI '00 Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Using tabu best-response search to find pure strategy nash equilibria in normal form games
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Learning payoff functions in infinite games
Machine Learning
Stochastic search methods for nash equilibrium approximation in simulation-based games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Using iterated best-response to find Bayes-Nash equilibria in auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Generalised fictitious play for a continuum of anonymous players
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Methods and algorithms for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types
Artificial Intelligence
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We describe an algorithm for computing best-response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of agents' actions. We show that this class includes many well-known games including a variety of auctions and a novel allocation game. In some cases, the best-response algorithm can be iterated to compute Bayes-Nash equilibria. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on existing and new games.