Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-ValueAuctions

Authors:
Michael B. Gordy
Affiliations:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, U.S.A.
Venue:
Computational Economics
Year:
1998

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Abstract

Although the mathematical foundations of common-value auctions have beenwell understood since Milgrom and Weber (1982), equilibrium biddingstrategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can befound in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paperintroduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enoughfor theoretical and empirical applications, yet permit straightforwardcalculation of equilibrium bidding strategies.