The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An Anonymous Electronic Bidding Protocol Based on a New Convertible Group Signature Scheme
ACISP '00 Proceedings of the 5th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Efficient Generation of Shared RSA Keys (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Distributed Auction Servers Resolving Winner and Winning Bid without Revealing Privacy of Bids
ICPADS '00 Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops
Gridlet economics: resource management models and policies for cycle-sharing systems
GPC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Advances in grid and pervasive computing
Secure peer-to-peer trading for multiplayer games
Proceedings of the 11th Annual Workshop on Network and Systems Support for Games
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In recent years, auctions have become a very popular price discovery mechanism. Among them, second-price auctions are of theoretical importance, as they have the simple dominant strategy of bidding ones true valuation. Sellers, however, are reluctant to do so, as a malicious auctioneer could take advantage of this knowledge. Several distributed auction mechanisms have been suggested that make it possible to determine the auction outcome without revealing the winner's valuation of the good; however, they are only suitable for sealed-bid auction.This paper suggests a distributed mechanism for ascending second price auctions. The auction protocol has the ability to preserve the privacy of the winning bidder's true valuation or highest bid, respectively, with a high probability. The auction protocol is based on a high number of auctioneers that are distributed to several groups. A bidder generates an encrypted chain of monotonously increasing bidding steps, where each bidding step can be decrypted by a different auctioneer group reducing the possibilities of manipulation for malicious auctioneers. Another fundamental advantage of this secure approach is that bidders need not be online except for submitting their bid chain to the auctioneers.