Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Breeding competitive strategies
Management Science
Price-war dynamics in a free-market economy of software agents
ALIFE Proceedings of the sixth international conference on Artificial life
The economics of network management
Communications of the ACM
Dynamic Load Balancing on Web-Server Systems
IEEE Internet Computing
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
On Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
TURBO: an autonomous execution environment with scalability and load balancing features
DIS '06 Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Distributed Intelligent Systems: Collective Intelligence and Its Applications
Decentralized and optimal control of shared resource pools
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS) - Special section on formal methods in pervasive computing, pervasive adaptation, and self-adaptive systems: Models and algorithms
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
A diversity dilemma in evolutionary markets
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
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We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers.Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe.Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.