Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems

  • Authors:
  • Peter R. Lewis;Paul Marrow;Xin Yao

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK;University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK and BT Group plc, Adastral Park, UK;University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature: PPSN X
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers.Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe.Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.