Communications of the ACM
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Evaluation of Electronic Voting: Requirements and Evaluation Procedures to Support Responsible Election Authorities
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Determine the Resilience of Evaluated Internet Voting Systems
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Candidate-resolved online voting protocol using distributed ElGamal Cryptosystem
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference
Transparency and technical measures to establish trust in norwegian internet voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Internet voting: fatally torn between conflicting goals?
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance
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Technical research has achieved strong advances in addressing security concerns in internet voting, yet the solutions are complicated and difficult to explain to the public. Accordingly, internet voting commonly faces opposition despite the benefits voters and authorities may expect. It appears that security features are only one premise underlying a system's acceptance among the electorate. The other challenge is to exploit these features at establishing the required trust among the public. In this paper we introduce a number of measures meant to help at gaining trust. We hereby emphasize the importance of taking the exposition of a system's security features and the remaining risks as the foundation of any strategy. After describing the proposed measures and discussing both their advantages and pitfalls, we relate them to four commonly known applied internet voting systems.