Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Evaluation of Electronic Voting: Requirements and Evaluation Procedures to Support Responsible Election Authorities
The development of remote e-voting around the world: a review of roads and directions
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A formal approach towards measuring trust in distributed systems
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Measures to establish trust in internet voting
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance
Transparency and technical measures to establish trust in norwegian internet voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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Internet voting gets more and more popular. It is generally accepted that an Internet voting system needs to be evaluated. The existing evaluation frameworks try to be as system-independent as possible. Because of that distributed trust concepts like separation of duty for the voting servers, four eyes principle for administrators and the election commission, as well as the multiplicity of control functions like for the counting of votes cannot be demanded precisely. This article proposes to extend the evaluation of Internet voting systems by the computation of a so called k-resilience value. This value defines the robustness of a system and helps to identify vulnerabilities. Besides the introduction and discussion of this value, it is computed for existing Internet voting