Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SSSL: shoulder surfing safe login
SoftCOM'09 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
ECCV'10 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Computer vision: Part VI
Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Display-camera calibration using eye reflections and geometry constraints
Computer Vision and Image Understanding
iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Shoulder-Surfing safe login in a partially observable attacker model
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Graphical passwords: Learning from the first twelve years
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Seeing double: reconstructing obscured typed input from repeated compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present a novel eavesdropping technique for spying at a distance on data that is displayed on an arbitrary computer screen, including the currently prevalent LCD monitors. Our technique exploits reflections of the screen's optical emanations in various objects that one commonly finds in close proximity to the screen and uses those reflections to recover the original screen content. Such objects include eyeglasses, tea pots, spoons, plastic bottles, and even the eye of the user. We have demonstrated that this attack can be successfully mounted to spy on even small fonts using inexpensive, off-the-shelf equipment (less than 1500 dollars) from a distance of up to 10 meters. Relying on more expensive equipment allowed us to conduct this attack from over 30 meters away, demonstrating that similar attacks are feasible from the other side of the street or from a close-by building. We additionally establish theoretical limitations of the attack; these limitations may help to estimate the risk that this attack can be successfully mounted in a given environment.