Practical second-order DPA attacks for masked smart card implementations of block ciphers

  • Authors:
  • Elisabeth Oswald;Stefan Mangard;Christoph Herbst;Stefan Tillich

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communciations (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communciations (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communciations (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communciations (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this article we describe an improved concept for second-order differential-power analysis (DPA) attacks on masked smart card implementations of block ciphers. Our concept allows to mount second-order DPA attacks in a rather simple way: a second-order DPA attack consists of a pre-processing step and a DPA step. Therefore, our way of performing second-order DPA attacks allows to easily assess the number of traces that are needed for a successful attack. We give evidence on the effectiveness of our methodology by showing practical attacks on a masked AES smart card implementation. In these attacks we target inputs and outputs of the SubBytes operation in the first encryption round.