Investigations of power analysis attacks and countermeasures for ARIA

Authors:
HyungSo Yoo;Christoph Herbst;Stefan Mangard;Elisabeth Oswald;SangJae Moon
Affiliations:
Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Korea;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Korea
Venue:
WISA'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security applications: PartI
Year:
2006

Citing 5
Cited 1

Provably secure masking of AES

SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A side-channel analysis resistant description of the AES s-box

FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Differential power analysis on block cipher ARIA

HPCC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on High Performance Computing and Communications
Practical second-order DPA attacks for masked smart card implementations of block ciphers

CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
An AES smart card implementation resistant to power analysis attacks

ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security

Differential fault analysis of ARIA in multi-byte fault models

Journal of Systems and Software

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper we investigate implementations of ARIA on an 8-bit smartcard. Our investigation focuses on the resistance against different types of differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. We show that an unprotected implementation of ARIA allows to deduce the secret key with a low number of measurements. In order to thwart these simple DPA attacks, we mask and randomize the ARIA implementation on the smartcard. It turns out that due to the structure of ARIA, a masked implementation requires significantly more resources than an unprotected implementation. However, the masked and randomized implementation provides a high resistance against power analysis attacks.