Differential power analysis on block cipher ARIA

  • Authors:
  • JaeCheol Ha;ChangKyun Kim;SangJae Moon;IlHwan Park;HyungSo Yoo

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Information and Communication, Korea Nazarene Univ., Korea;National Security Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea;Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungpook National Univ., Korea;National Security Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea;Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungpook National Univ., Korea

  • Venue:
  • HPCC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on High Performance Computing and Communications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

ARIA is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher having 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key lengths. The cipher is a substitution-permutation encryption network (SPN) that uses an involutional binary matrix. This paper shows that a careless implementation of ARIA on smartcards is vulnerable to a differential power analysis attack. This attack is realistic because we can measure power consumption signals at two kinds of S-boxes and two types of substitution layers. By analyzing the power traces, we can find all round keys and also extract a master key from only two round keys using circular rotation, XOR, and involutional operations for two types of layers.