CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On Boolean and Arithmetic Masking against Differential Power Analysis
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
Power-Analysis Attack on an ASIC AES implementation
ITCC '04 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'04) Volume 2 - Volume 2
Computational Intelligence and Security
Investigations of power analysis attacks and countermeasures for ARIA
WISA'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security applications: PartI
Differential fault analysis of ARIA in multi-byte fault models
Journal of Systems and Software
Applying remote side-channel analysis attacks on a security-enabled NFC tag
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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ARIA is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher having 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key lengths. The cipher is a substitution-permutation encryption network (SPN) that uses an involutional binary matrix. This paper shows that a careless implementation of ARIA on smartcards is vulnerable to a differential power analysis attack. This attack is realistic because we can measure power consumption signals at two kinds of S-boxes and two types of substitution layers. By analyzing the power traces, we can find all round keys and also extract a master key from only two round keys using circular rotation, XOR, and involutional operations for two types of layers.