CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On the Masking Countermeasure and Higher-Order Power Analysis Attacks
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Protecting AES Software Implementations on 32-Bit Processors Against Power Analysis
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Side Channel Cryptanalysis of a Higher Order Masking Scheme
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Practical second-order DPA attacks for masked smart card implementations of block ciphers
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Higher order masking of the AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
On second-order differential power analysis
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
An AES smart card implementation resistant to power analysis attacks
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Template attacks on masking—resistance is futile
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Higher-Order Masking and Shuffling for Software Implementations of Block Ciphers
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
You Cannot Hide behind the Mask: Power Analysis on a Provably Secure S-Box Implementation
Information Security Applications
Improving first order differential power attacks through digital signal processing
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security of information and networks
Correlation-enhanced power analysis collision attack
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Provably secure higher-order masking of AES
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Principles on the security of AES against first and second-order differential power analysis
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Lightweight cryptography and DPA countermeasures: a survey
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial cryptograpy and data security
Power analysis attack and countermeasure on the Rabbit Stream Cipher (position paper)
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Systems
Montgomery's trick and fast implementation of masked AES
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Generic side-channel countermeasures for reconfigurable devices
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
A code morphing methodology to automate power analysis countermeasures
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
Shuffling against side-channel attacks: a comprehensive study with cautionary note
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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In order to protect software implementations of secret-key cryptographic primitives against side channel attacks, a software developer has only a limited choice of countermeasures. A combination of masking and randomization of operations in time promises good protection and can be realized without too much overhead. Recently, new advanced DPA methods have been proposed to attack software implementations with such kind of protection. In this work, we have applied these methods successfully to break a protected AES software implementation on a programmable smart card. Thus, we were able to verify the practicality of the new attacks and to estimate their effectiveness in comparison to traditional DPA attacks on unprotected implementations. In the course of our work, we have also refined and improved the original attacks, so that they can be mounted more efficiently. Our practical results indicate that the effort required for attacking the protected implementation with the examined methods is more than two orders of magnitude higher compared to an attack on an unprotected implementation.