A code morphing methodology to automate power analysis countermeasures

  • Authors:
  • Giovanni Agosta;Alessandro Barenghi;Gerardo Pelosi

  • Affiliations:
  • Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, Milano, Italy;Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, Milano, Italy;Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, Milano, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

We introduce a general framework to automate the application of countermeasures against Differential Power Attacks aimed at software implementations of cryptographic primitives. The approach enables the generation of multiple versions of the code, to prevent an attacker from recognizing the exact point in time where the observed operation is executed and how such operation is performed. The strategy increases the effort needed to retrieve the secret key through hindering the formulation of a correct hypothetical consumption to be correlated with the power measurements. The experimental evaluation shows how a DPA attack against OpenSSL AES implementation on an industrial grade ARM-based SoC is hindered with limited performance overhead.