Discrete-time signal processing (2nd ed.)
Discrete-time signal processing (2nd ed.)
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power and electromagnetic analysis: improved model, consequences and comparisons
Integration, the VLSI Journal - Special issue: Embedded cryptographic hardware
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
EM analysis of a wireless Java-based PDA
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
Improving first order differential power attacks through digital signal processing
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security of information and networks
Enhancing correlation electromagnetic attack using planar near-field cartography
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A code morphing methodology to automate power analysis countermeasures
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
Improving side-channel analysis with optimal linear transforms
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Secure and efficient design of software block cipher implementations on microcontrollers
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
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Side channel attacks analyzing both power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiations are a well known threat to the security of devices dealing with sensitive data. Whilst it is well known that the EM emissions of a chip represent an information leakage stronger than the overall dynamic power consumption, the actual relation between the emissions and the computations is still a subject under exploration. It is important for the chip designer to be able to distinguish which portions of the measured EM emissions are actually correlated with the sensitive information. Our technique obtains a detailed profile of the information leakage, identifying which harmonic components carry the largest part of the it on the measured signals. It may be successfully integrated in a design workflow as a post-testing feedback from the prototype chip, in the form of additional constraints aimed at reducing the local wires congestion up to a point where the emissions are no longer sufficient to conduct an attack. The analysis allows the design of ad-hoc countermeasures (shields and/or EM jammers), which do not require architectural changes to the chip. We provide a validation of the proposed technique on a commercial grade ARM Cortex-M3 based System on Chip (SoC), executing a software implementation of AES-128. The proposed approach is more efficient than a search of the whole frequency spectrum, allowing to conduct a deeper analysis with the same timing constraints.