The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An Efficient Hardware-Based Fault Diagnosis Scheme for AES: Performances and Cost
DFT '04 Proceedings of the Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems, 19th IEEE International Symposium
New Differential Fault Analysis on AES Key Schedule: Two Faults Are Enough
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Practical Setup Time Violation Attacks on AES
EDCC-7 '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Seventh European Dependable Computing Conference
Double-Data-Rate Computation as a Countermeasure against Fault Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A Practical Fault Attack on Square and Multiply
FDTC '08 Proceedings of the 2008 5th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation Revisited
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Optical Fault Attacks on AES: A Threat in Violet
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Low Voltage Fault Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Countermeasures against fault attacks on software implemented AES: effectiveness and cost
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Coordinate blinding over large prime fields
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Differential Fault Analysis against AES-192 and AES-256 with Minimal Faults
FDTC '10 Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Differential fault analysis of the advanced encryption standard using a single fault
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
A Differential Fault Analysis on AES Key Schedule Using Single Fault
FDTC '11 Proceedings of the 2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Differential fault analysis of AES: Toward reducing number of faults
Information Sciences: an International Journal
A code morphing methodology to automate power analysis countermeasures
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
New Fault-Based Side-Channel Attack Using Fault Sensitivity
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Part 1
Fault Analysis in Cryptography
Fault Analysis in Cryptography
A Method for Preventing "Skipping" Attacks
SPW '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Compiler-based side channel vulnerability analysis and optimized countermeasures application
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference
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Fault injection attacks have proven to be a powerful tool to exploit the implementation weaknesses of cryptographic algorithms. Several techniques perturbing the computation of a cipher have been devised and successfully employed to leak secret information from erroneous results. We present a low-cost, non-invasive and effective technique to inject transient faults into a general purpose processor through lowering its feeding voltage, and to characterize the effects on the computing system. This technique is effective enough to lead attacks against a software implementation of a cryptosystem running on a full fledged ARM9 CPU with a complete operating system. We validate the effectiveness of the fault model through attacking OpenSSL implementations of the RSA and AES cryptosystems. A new attack against AES, able to retrieve the full 256-bit key, is described, and the number of faults to be collected is delineated. In addition, we propose a generalization of the attack against the RSA encryption presented in Barenghi et al. (2009), to a multi-bit fault model, and the analysis of its computational complexity. The attacks against AES retrieve all the round keys regardless of their derivation strategy, the number of cipher rounds and the diffusion layer, while the attacks against RSA retrieve either the message or the secret key.