Differential Fault Analysis against AES-192 and AES-256 with Minimal Faults

Authors:
Chong Hee Kim
Affiliations:
-
Venue:
FDTC '10 Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Year:
2010

Citing 0
Cited 5

An improved differential fault analysis on AES-256

AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Meet-in-the-middle and impossible differential fault analysis on AES

CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Differential fault analysis of AES: Toward reducing number of faults

Information Sciences: an International Journal
Differential fault analysis of ARIA in multi-byte fault models

Journal of Systems and Software
A fault induction technique based on voltage underfeeding with application to attacks against AES and RSA

Journal of Systems and Software

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The naive implementation of AES is known to be vulnerable to Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). We can findthe key of AES-128 (AES with 128-bit key) with one pair of correct and faulty cipher texts. Recently several works on the extension of the attack to AES with 192 and 256-bit key have been published. Due to the longer key size and the characteristic of AES key schedule, we need subtle caution in attacking AES-192and AES-256. We propose new DFA against AES with 192 and256-bit key. We could retrieve AES-192 key with two pairs of correct and faulty cipher texts. With three pairs we could succeed in finding the key of AES-256. These are the minimal faults among the existing methods.