Differentially uniform mappings for cryptography
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
DFA Mechanism on the AES Key Schedule
FDTC '07 Proceedings of the Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
New Differential Fault Analysis on AES Key Schedule: Two Faults Are Enough
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
An Improved Fault Based Attack of the Advanced Encryption Standard
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
A generalized method of differential fault attack against AES cryptosystem
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
Differential fault analysis of AES-128 key schedule using a single multi-byte fault
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Combined fault and side-channel attack on protected implementations of AES
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Differential fault analysis of AES: Toward reducing number of faults
Information Sciences: an International Journal
A fault attack on the LED block cipher
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Journal of Systems and Software
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
A fault-resistant implementation of AES using differential bytes between input and output
The Journal of Supercomputing
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In this paper we present a differential fault attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced at the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step has a statistical expectation of reducing the possible key hypotheses to 232, and the second step to a mere 28.