Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation Revisited

Authors:
Arnaud Boscher;Helena Handschuh;Elena Trichina
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Year:
2009

Citing 0
Cited 3

A new CRT-RSA algorithm resistant to powerful fault attacks

WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Memory-efficient fault countermeasures

CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
A fault induction technique based on voltage underfeeding with application to attacks against AES and RSA

Journal of Systems and Software

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Cryptographic algorithm implementations are subject to specific attacks, called side channel attacks, focusing on the analysis of their power consumption or execution time or on the analysis of faulty computations. At FDTC06, Fumaroli and Vigilant presented a generic method to compute an exponentiation resistant against different side channel attacks. However, even if this algorithm does not reveal information on the secrets in case of a fault attack, it can not be used to safely implement a crypto-system involving an exponentiation. In this paper, we propose a new exponentiation method without this drawback and give a security proof of resistance to fault attacks. As an application, we propose an RSA algorithm implemented using the Chinese Remainder Theorem protected against side channel attacks. The exponentiation algorithm is also33% faster than the previous method.