On the use of shamir's secret sharing against side-channel analysis

  • Authors:
  • Jean-Sébastien Coron;Emmanuel Prouff;Thomas Roche

  • Affiliations:
  • Tranef, France;ANSSI, Paris 07 SP, France;ANSSI, Paris 07 SP, France

  • Venue:
  • CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

At CHES 2011 Goubin and Martinelli described a new countermeasure against side-channel analysis for AES based on Shamir's secret-sharing scheme. In the present paper, we exhibit a flaw in this scheme and we show that it is always theoretically broken by a first-order side-channel analysis. As a consequence of this attack, only a slight adaptation of the scheme proposed by Ben-Or et al.at STOC in 1988 can securely process multiplications on data shared with Shamir's technique. In the second part of this paper, we propose an improvement of this scheme that leads to a complexity ${\cal \tilde O}(d^2)$ instead of ${\cal O}(d^3)$, where d is the number of shares per data.