CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
On the Classification of 4 Bit S-Boxes
WAIFI '07 Proceedings of the 1st international workshop on Arithmetic of Finite Fields
Secure Hardware Implementation of Nonlinear Functions in the Presence of Glitches
Journal of Cryptology - Special Issue on Hardware and Security
Side-Channel Resistant Crypto for Less than 2,300 GE
Journal of Cryptology - Special Issue on Hardware and Security
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic: DPA-resistance without routing constraints
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Statistical tools flavor side-channel collision attacks
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Threshold implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 s-boxes
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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One of the most promising lightweight hardware countermeasures against SCA attacks is the so-called Threshold Implementation (TI) [12] countermeasure. In this work we discuss issues towards its applicability and introduce solutions to boost its implementation efficiency. In particular, our contribution is three-fold: first we introduce two methodologies to efficiently implement 3-share TI to a given S-box. Second, as an example, we successfully apply these methodologies to PRESENT and are able to decrease the area requirements of its protected S-box by 37-40%. Third, we present the first successful practical Mutual Information Attack on the original 3-share TI implementation of PRESENT and compare it with a correlation-enhanced collision attack using second-order moments.