Threshold implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 s-boxes

  • Authors:
  • Begül Bilgin;Svetla Nikova;Ventzislav Nikov;Vincent Rijmen;Georg Stütz

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Belgium,EEMCS-DIES, University of Twente, The Netherlands;Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Belgium;NXP Semiconductors, Belgium;Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Belgium,IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria;IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria

  • Venue:
  • CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Side-channel attacks have proven many hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms to be vulnerable. A recently proposed masking method, based on secret sharing and multi-party computation methods, introduces a set of sufficient requirements for implementations to be provably resistant against first-order DPA with minimal assumptions on the hardware. The original paper doesn't describe how to construct the Boolean functions that are to be used in the implementation. In this paper, we derive the functions for all invertible 3 ×3, 4 ×4 S-boxes and the 6 ×4 DES S-boxes. Our methods and observations can also be used to accelerate the search for sharings of larger (e.g. 8 ×8) S-boxes. Finally, we investigate the cost of such protection.