Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On Boolean and Arithmetic Masking against Differential Power Analysis
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Sound Method for Switching between Boolean and Arithmetic Masking
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On two DES implementations secure against differential power analysis in smart-cards
Information and Computation
Block Ciphers Implementations Provably Secure Against Second Order Side Channel Analysis
Fast Software Encryption
Principles on the security of AES against first and second-order differential power analysis
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Leakage squeezing countermeasure against high-order attacks
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
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Since Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on DES in smart-cards was firstly published by Kocher et al. in 1999, many countermeasures have been proposed to protect cryptographic algorithms from the attack, of which masking is an efficient and easily implemented method. In this paper, after showing some attacks on Akkar et al. ’s improved DES implementation from FSE’04, we list and prove some basic requirements for a DES implementation using masking methods to defense High-Order DPA attacks, then present an enhancement of Akkar et al. ’s DES implementation, which requires only three random 32-bit masks and six additional S-Boxes to be generated every computation. Finally, we prove that three random 32-bit masks and six additional S-Boxes are the minimal cost for a DES implementation masking all the outputs of the S-Boxes of the sixteen rounds to be secure against High-Order DPA attacks.