Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Enhanced DES implementation secure against high-order differential power analysis in smartcards
ACISP'05 Proceedings of the 10th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Principles on the security of AES against first and second-order differential power analysis
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
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Masking is one of the efficient and easily implemented countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms in such resource limited environments as smart-cards from differential power analysis as well as simple power analysis that were first introduced by Kocher et al. in 1999. To defend differential power analysis attacks, Akkar and Giraud presented a Transformed Masking Method and applied it to DES implementation in 2001. Unfortunately, in 2003, Akkar and Goubin showed a superposition attack that actually is a high-order differential power analysis attack on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, and finally they presented a DES implementation using their proposed Unique Masking Method to defend any order differential power analysis attacks, which was later improved by Akkar, Bévan and Goubin in 2004. In this paper, by exploiting a new artifice to classify the electric consumption curves, we show that Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to a high-order differential power analysis attack. Besides, we find it is also vulnerable to a superposition attack. We also present four new differential power analysis attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.