Mutual Information Analysis: a Comprehensive Study

  • Authors:
  • Lejla Batina;Benedikt Gierlichs;Emmanuel Prouff;Matthieu Rivain;François-Xavier Standaert;Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon

  • Affiliations:
  • K.U.Leuven, ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium and Radboud University Nijmegen, CS Dept./Digital Security group, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525, Nijmegen, A ...;K.U.Leuven, ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium;Oberthur Technologies, 71-73 rue des Hautes Pâtures, 92726, Nanterre Cedex, France;CryptoExperts, Paris, France;Université catholique de Louvain, UCL Crypto Group, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;Université catholique de Louvain, UCL Crypto Group, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Cryptology - Special Issue on Hardware and Security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Mutual Information Analysis is a generic side-channel distinguisher that has been introduced at CHES 2008. It aims to allow successful attacks requiring minimum assumptions and knowledge of the target device by the adversary. In this paper, we compile recent contributions and applications of MIA in a comprehensive study. From a theoretical point of view, we carefully discuss its statistical properties and relationship with probability density estimation tools. From a practical point of view, we apply MIA in two of the most investigated contexts for side-channel attacks. Namely, we consider first-order attacks against an unprotected implementation of the DES in a full custom IC and second-order attacks against a masked implementation of the DES in an 8-bit microcontroller. These experiments allow to put forward the strengths and weaknesses of this new distinguisher and to compare it with standard power analysis attacks using the correlation coefficient.