CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Number Generators Founded on Signal and Information Theory
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Design of Reliable True Random Number Generator for Cryptographic Applications
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Compact FPGA-based True and Pseudo Random Number Generators
FCCM '03 Proceedings of the 11th Annual IEEE Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines
The Caernarvon secure embedded operating system
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against side-channel key recovery
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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This paper describes the design of the random number generator (RNG) in the Caernarvon high assurance smart card operating system. Since it is used in the generation of cryptographic keys and other sensitive materials, the RNG has a number of stringent security requirements that the random bits must be of good quality i.e. the bits must not be predictable or biased. To this end, a number of standards such as the German AIS 31 mandate that true random bits be continuously tested before use in sensitive applications such as key generation. A key issue in implementing this standard is that such testing before use in key generation greatly increases the attack surface for side-channel attacks. For example, template attacks which can extract information about the random bits from even a single run provided we use the same bits at many different points in the computation. Because of these potential risks, the Caernarvon operating system uses pseudo random number generators which are initially seeded by externally generated high quality random bits, and then perturbed by bits from the true random number generator. We describe a PRNG design which yields high quality random bits while also ensuring that it is not susceptible to side-channel attacks and provide an informal argument about its effectiveness.