On large-vocabulary speaker-independent continuous speech recognition
Speech Communication - Word Recognition in Large Vocabularies
Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Introduction to Data Mining, (First Edition)
Introduction to Data Mining, (First Edition)
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Predicting tie strength with social media
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Fingerprinting websites using remote traffic analysis
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Virtual WiFi: bring virtualization from wired to wireless
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environments
Privacy in VoIP Networks: Flow Analysis Attacks and Defense
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Inferring users' online activities through traffic analysis
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Noise Reduction in Side Channel Attack Using Fourth-Order Cumulant
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
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Private communication detection (PCD) enables an ordinary network user to discover communication patterns (e.g., call time, length, frequency, and initiator) between two or more private parties. Ordinary users have neither eavesdropping capabilities (e.g., the network may employ strong anonymity measures) nor legal authority (e.g., collection of call records---without any voice/data content---requires "national security letters") to collect private-communication records. Analysis of communication patterns between private parties has historically been a powerful tool used by intelligence, military, law-enforcement and business organizations as it can reveal the strength of tie between these parties. In this paper, we show that PCD is possible by ordinary users merely by sending packets to various network end-nodes (e.g., WiFi nodes) and analyzing the timing of their responses. We show that timing side channels, which are caused by distinct resource-contention responses when different applications run in end nodes, enable effective PCD despite network and proxy-generated noise (e.g., jitter, delays). We use a stochastic analysis to demonstrate how PCD exploits indirectly accessible, remote end-node resources, such as WiFi radio channels and computer keyboards in Instant Messaging. Similar analysis enables practical Sybil node detection.