A qualitative security analysis of a new class of 3-d integrated crypto co-processors

  • Authors:
  • Jonathan Valamehr;Ted Huffmire;Cynthia Irvine;Ryan Kastner;$#199/etin Kaya Ko$#231/;Timothy Levin;Timothy Sherwood

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Santa Barbara;Naval Postgraduate School;Naval Postgraduate School;University of California, San Diego;University of California, Santa Barbara;Naval Postgraduate School;University of California, Santa Barbara

  • Venue:
  • Cryptography and Security
  • Year:
  • 2012
  • 3D hardware canaries

    CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

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Abstract

3-D integration presents many new opportunities for architects and embedded systems designers. However, 3-D integration has not yet been explored by the cryptographic hardware community. Traditionally, crypto co-processors have been implemented as a separate die or by utilizing one or more cores in a chip multiprocessor. These methods have their drawbacks and limitations in terms of tamper-resistance, side-channel immunity and performance. In this work we propose a new class of co-processors that are "snapped-on" to the main processor using 3-D integration, and we investigate their security ramifications. These 3-D co-processors hold many advantages over previous implementations. This paper begins with an overview of 3-D integration and its prior applications. We then outline security threat models relevant to crypto co-processors and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using a dedicated 3-D crypto co-processor compared to traditional, commodity, off-chip crypto co-processors. We also discuss the performance improvements that can be gained from using a 3-D approach.