Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
Digital communication systems
Digital and Analog Communication Systems
Digital and Analog Communication Systems
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Automatic code recognition for smart cards using a Kohonen neural network
CARDIS'02 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference - Volume 5
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems (TRETS)
Security implications of crosstalk in switching CMOS gates
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
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Microprocessor devices, such as smart cards, are used more and more to store and protect secret information. This development has its advantages, but microprocessor devices are susceptible to various attacks. Much attention has been devoted to side-channel attacks, exploiting unintentional correlation between internal secret information, such as cryptographic keys, and the various side channels. We present a wireless covert channel attack (WCCA) that intentionally correlates secret information with the electromagnetic side channel. WCCA exploits subversive code hidden on all cards during manufacture, to launch an attack, without physical access, when infected cards are used. Experiments on modern smart cards confirm that an insider with the opportunity to hide subversive code can potentially broadcast the card's internal secrets to a nearby receiver. Security features against side-channel attacks will limit the range but not prevent the attack.