Power attacks on a side-channel resistant elliptic curve implementation

Authors:
Willi Geiselmann;Rainer Steinwandt
Affiliations:
Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme, Arbeitsgruppe Systemsicherheit Prof Dr. Th. Beth, Universität Karlsruhe, Am Fasanengarten 5, 76 131 Karlsruhe, Germany;Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme, Arbeitsgruppe Systemsicherheit Prof Dr. Th. Beth, Universität Karlsruhe, Am Fasanengarten 5, 76 131 Karlsruhe, Germany
Venue:
Information Processing Letters - Devoted to the rapid publication of short contributions to information processing
Year:
2004

Citing 6
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Abstract

At ISC 2001 a method for securing elliptic curve point multiplication against side-channel attacks has been proposed by Möller [Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2200, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2001, pp. 324-334]. We show that this method does not offer acceptable security. Namely, differential and simple power analysis techniques may reveal the complete secret key.