Software Implementation of the NIST Elliptic Curves Over Prime Fields
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
More Flexible Exponentiation with Precomputation
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Elliptic Curve Exponentiation Using Mixed Coordinates
ASIACRYPT '98 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Securing Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication against Side-Channel Attacks
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
A Second-Order DPA Attack Breaks a Window-Method Based Countermeasure against Side Channel Attacks
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
A Refined Power-Analysis Attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2m) without Precomputation
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Preventing SPA/DPA in ECC Systems Using the Jacobi Form
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Hessian Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Protections against Differential Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power attacks on a side-channel resistant elliptic curve implementation
Information Processing Letters - Devoted to the rapid publication of short contributions to information processing
Exponent Recoding and Regular Exponentiation Algorithms
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
Enhanced doubling attacks on signed-all-bits set recoding
WISTP'07 Proceedings of the 1st IFIP TC6 /WG8.8 /WG11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart cards, mobile and ubiquitous computing systems
Signed MSB-set comb method for elliptic curve point multiplication
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Improved fixed-base comb method for fast scalar multiplication
AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
SPA countermeasure based on unsigned left-to-right recodings
ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
Message blinding method requiring no multiplicative inversion for RSA
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
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Side Channel Attacks have become a serious threat for cryptographic applications on devices with small resources. Indeed, it turns out that the usual randomization techniques can not prevent the recent DPA attacks (RPA and ZPA). The implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) on such devices must combine an optimized use of space memory with a high level of security and efficiency. In this paper we present an efficient SCA-resistant algorithm based on the fixed-base comb method. We propose to modify the binary representation of the secret scalar in order to obtain a new sequence of non-zero bit-strings. This, combined with the use of Randomized Linearly-transformed coordinates (RLC), will prevent the SCA attacks on the comb method, including RPA and ZPA. Furthermore, our algorithm optimizes the size of the precomputed table; we only store 2w−−1 points instead of 2w – 1 for the fixed-base comb method, without affecting in any way the computation time. We also present another countermeasure using a Randomized Initial Point (RIP) to protect the fixed-base comb method against SCA attacks including RPA and ZPA, with an optimized amount of computing time. The cost of this countermeasure does not exceed 2% of the total cost of the fixed-base comb method.