CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Introduction to Electromagnetic Compatibility (Wiley Series in Microwave and Optical Engineering)
Introduction to Electromagnetic Compatibility (Wiley Series in Microwave and Optical Engineering)
Power and electromagnetic analysis: improved model, consequences and comparisons
Integration, the VLSI Journal - Special issue: Embedded cryptographic hardware
High-resolution side-channel attack using phase-based waveform matching
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
DPA leakage models for CMOS logic circuits
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
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This paper presents radiation mechanism behind Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) from remote locations. It has been widely known that electromagnetic radiation from a cryptographic chip could be exploited to conduct side-channel attacks, yet the mechanism behind the radiation has not been intensively studied. In this paper, the mechanism is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC): electric fluctuation released from a cryptographic chip can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments. For this purpose, Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) are conducted on FPGA implementations of RSA and AES, respectively. In the experiments, radiation from power and communication cables attached to the FPGA platform is measured. The result indicates, the information leakage can extend beyond security boundaries through such cables, even if the module implements countermeasures against invasive attacks to deny access at its boundary. We conclude that the proposed mechanism can be used to predict circuit components that cause information leakage. We also discuss advanced attacks and noise suppression technologies as countermeasures.