A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Integrating hardware and software information flow analyses
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED conference on Languages, compilers, and tools for embedded systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In recent years much research has been devoted to producing formal models of security for cryptographic primitives and to designing schemes that can be proved secure in such models. This line of research typically assumes that an adversary is given black-box access to a cryptographic mechanism that uses some secret key. One then proves that this black-box access does not help the adversary to achieve its task. An increasingly popular environment for cryptographic implementation is the smart-card. In such an environment a definition of security that provides an adversary with only black-box access to the cryptography under attack may be unrealistic. This is illustrated by attacks such as the power-analysis methods proposed by Kocher and others. In this paper we attempt to formally define a set of necessary conditions on an implementation of a cryptosystem so that security against an adversary with black-box access is preserved in a more hostile environment such as the smart-card. Unlike the previous work in this area we concentrate on high-level primitives. The particular example that we take is the digital signature scheme.