Theory and practice of a leakage resilient masking scheme

  • Authors:
  • Josep Balasch;Sebastian Faust;Benedikt Gierlichs;Ingrid Verbauwhede

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium;Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark;Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium;Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

A recent trend in cryptography is to formally prove the leakage resilience of cryptographic implementations --- that is, one formally shows that a scheme remains provably secure even in the presence of side channel leakage. Although many of the proposed schemes are secure in a surprisingly strong model, most of them are unfortunately rather inefficient and come without practical security evaluations nor implementation attempts. In this work, we take a further step towards closing the gap between theoretical leakage resilient cryptography and more practice-oriented research. In particular, we show that masking countermeasures based on the inner product do not only exhibit strong theoretical leakage resilience, but moreover provide better practical security or efficiency than earlier masking countermeasures. We demonstrate the feasibility of inner product masking by giving a secured implementation of the AES for an 8-bit processor.