CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Leakage-Resilient Mode of Operation
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Protecting cryptographic keys against continual leakage
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Securing computation against continuous leakage
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Protecting circuits from leakage: the computationally-bounded and noisy cases
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Leakage-Resilient cryptography from the inner-product extractor
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Theory and practice of a leakage resilient masking scheme
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Shielding circuits with groups
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Iterated group products and leakage resilience against NC1
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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Physical cryptographic devices inadvertently leak information through numerous side-channels. Such leakage is exploited by so-called side-channel attacks, which often allow for a complete security breache. A recent trend in cryptography is to propose formal models to incorporate leakage into the model and to construct schemes that are provably secure within them. We design a general compiler that transforms any cryptographic scheme, e.g., a block-cipher, into a functionally equivalent scheme which is resilient to any continual leakage provided that the following three requirements are satisfied: (i) in each observation the leakage is bounded, (ii) different parts of the computation leak independently, and (iii) the randomness that is used for certain operations comes from a simple (non-uniform) distribution. In contrast to earlier work on leakage resilient circuit compilers, which relied on computational assumptions, our results are purely information-theoretic. In particular, we do not make use of public key encryption, which was required in all previous works.