Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
A Leakage-Resilient Mode of Operation
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On cryptography with auxiliary input
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Securing computation against continuous leakage
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Cryptography against Continuous Memory Attacks
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Public-key encryption schemes with auxiliary inputs
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Protecting circuits from leakage: the computationally-bounded and noisy cases
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Parallel repetition for leakage resilience amplification revisited
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Achieving leakage resilience through dual system encryption
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Signatures resilient to continual leakage on memory and computation
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
After-the-fact leakage in public-key encryption
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tamper-proof circuits: how to trade leakage for tamper-resilience
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Leakage-resilient zero knowledge
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Key-evolution schemes resilient to space-bounded leakage
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Cryptography with tamperable and leaky memory
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Leakage-Resilient cryptography from the inner-product extractor
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Program obfuscation with leaky hardware
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Multiparty computation secure against continual memory leakage
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Leakage-Resilient circuits without computational assumptions
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Multi-location leakage resilient cryptography
PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Theory and practice of a leakage resilient masking scheme
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Shielding circuits with groups
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Iterated group products and leakage resilience against NC1
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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Side-channel attacks have often proven to have a devastating effect on the security of cryptographic schemes. In this paper, we address the problem of storing cryptographic keys and computing on them in a manner that preserves security even when the adversary is able to obtain information leakage during the computation on the key. Using any fully homomorphic encryption with re-randomizable ciphertexts, we show how to encapsulate a key and repeatedly evaluate arbitrary functions on it so that no adversary can gain any useful information from a large class of side-channel attacks. We work in the model of Micali and Reyzin, assuming that only the active part of memory during computation leaks information. Our construction makes use of a single "leak-free" hardware token that samples from a distribution that does not depend on the protected key or the function that is evaluated on it. Our construction is the first general compiler to achieve resilience against polytime leakage functions without performing any leak-free computation on the protected key. Furthermore, the amount of computation our construction must perform does not grow with the amount of leakage the adversary is able to obtain; instead, it suffices to make a stronger assumption about the security of the fully homomorphic encryption.