Generating quasi-random sequences from semi-random sources
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Combinatorica - Theory of Computing
Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
SIAM Journal on Computing
Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Unbiased bits from sources of weak randomness and probabilistic communication complexity
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Communications of the ACM - Security in the Browser
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Protecting cryptographic keys against continual leakage
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Securing computation against continuous leakage
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Randomness leakage in the KEM/DEM framework
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
Leakage-Tolerant interactive protocols
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Distributed public key schemes secure against continual leakage
PODC '12 Proceedings of the 2012 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Anonymous identity-based hash proof system and its applications
ProvSec'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Provable Security
Barriers in cryptography with weak, correlated and leaky sources
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Robust pseudorandom generators
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
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What does it mean for an encryption scheme to be leakage-resilient? Prior formulations require that the scheme remains semantically secure even in the presence of leakage, but only considered leakage that occurs before the challenge ciphertext is generated. Although seemingly necessary, this restriction severely limits the usefulness of the resulting notion. In this work we study after-the-fact leakage, namely leakage that the adversary obtains after seeing the challenge ciphertext. We seek a "natural" and realizable notion of security, which is usable in higher-level protocols and applications. To this end, we formulate entropic leakage-resilient PKE. This notion captures the intuition that as long as the entropy of the encrypted message is higher than the amount of leakage, the message still has some (pseudo) entropy left. We show that this notion is realized by the Naor-Segev constructions (using hash proof systems). We demonstrate that entropic leakage-resilience is useful by showing a simple construction that uses it to get semantic security in the presence of after-the-fact leakage, in a model of bounded memory leakage from a split state.