Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
HIDE: an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information leakage on the address bus
ASPLOS XI Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
An On-Chip Signal Suppression Countermeasure to Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Power Attack Resistant Cryptosystem Design: A Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching Approach
Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 3
Gate sizing: finFETs vs 32nm bulk MOSFETs
Proceedings of the 43rd annual Design Automation Conference
Protection Circuit against Differential Power Analysis Attacks for Smart Cards
IEEE Transactions on Computers
ICCD'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Computer design
A low overhead DPA countermeasure circuit based on ring oscillators
IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Protecting circuits from leakage: the computationally-bounded and noisy cases
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Towards trustworthy medical devices and body area networks
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference
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Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack that statistically analyzes the power consumption of a cryptographic system to obtain secret information. This type of attack is well known as a major threat to information security. Effective solutions with low energy and area cost for improved DPA resistance are urgently needed, especially for energy-constrained modern devices that are often in the physical proximity of attackers. This article presents a novel countermeasure against DPA attacks on smart cards and other digital ICs based on FinFETs, an emerging substitute for bulk CMOS at the 22nm technology node and beyond. We exploit the adaptive power management characteristic of FinFETs to generate a high level of noise at critical moments in the execution of a cryptosystem to thwart DPA attacks. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure by developing a simple power model for estimating DPA spikes. We then validate the model by carrying out DPA attacks on an ASIC implementation of the advanced encryption standard system via gate-level simulation. Both modeling and simulation-based experiment indicate that with the proposed countermeasure, even 8,000,000 power acquisitions are not sufficient to reveal the secret key. As opposed to other countermeasures presented in the literature, the proposed hardware design requires less than 1% increase in area and 15% increase in total energy consumption without any extra delay in the critical path. The proposed method is generic and can be applied to other encryption algorithms as well.