A low overhead DPA countermeasure circuit based on ring oscillators

Authors:
Po-Chun Liu;Hsie-Chia Chang;Chen-Yi Lee
Affiliations:
Department of Electronics Engineering and Institute of Electronics, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan;Department of Electronics Engineering and Institute of Electronics, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan;Department of Electronics Engineering and Institute of Electronics, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan
Venue:
IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Side-channel attacks, particularly differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, are efficient ways to extract secret keys of the attacked devices by leaked physical information. To resist DPA attacks, hiding and masking methods are commonly used, but it usually resulted in high area overhead and performance degradation. In this brief, a DPA countermeasure circuit based on digital controlled ring oscillators is presented to efficiently resist the first-order DPA attack. The implementation of the critical S-box of the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm shows that the area overhead of a single S-box is about 19% without any extra delay in the critical path. Moreover, the countermeasure circuit can be mounted onto different S-box implementations based on composite field or look-up table (LUT). Based on our approach, a DPA-resistant AES chip can be proposed to maintain the same throughput with less than 2K extra gates.