HIDE: an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information leakage on the address bus

  • Authors:

  • Xiaotong Zhuang;Tao Zhang;Santosh Pande

  • Affiliations:

  • Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA

  • Venue:
  • ASPLOS XI Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

XOM-based secure processor has recently been introduced as a mechanism to provide copy and tamper resistant execution. XOM provides support for encryption/decryption and integrity checking. However, neither XOM nor any other current approach adequately addresses the problem of information leakage via the address bus. This paper shows that without address bus protection, the XOM model is severely crippled. Two realistic attacks are shown and experiments show that 70% of the code might be cracked and sensitive data might be exposed leading to serious security breaches.Although the problem of address bus leakage has been widely acknowledged both in industry and academia, no practical solution has ever been proposed that can provide an adequate security guarantee. The main reason is that the problem is very difficult to solve in practice due to severe performance degradation which accompanies most of the solutions. This paper presents an infrastructure called HIDE (Hardware-support for leakage-Immune Dynamic Execution) which provides a solution consisting of chunk-level protection with hardware support and a flexible interface which can be orchestrated through the proposed compiler optimization and user specifications that allow utilizing underlying hardware solution more efficiently to provide better security guarantees.Our results show that protecting both data and code with a high level of security guarantee is possible with negligible performance penalty (1.3% slowdown).