CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
SCARE of an Unknown Hardware Feistel Implementation
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
An improved SCARE cryptanalysis against a secret A3/A8 GSM algorithm
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Power analysis for secret recovering and reverse engineering of public key algorithms
SAC'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Defeating any secret cryptography with SCARE attacks
LATINCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Progress in cryptology: cryptology and information security in Latin America
FIRE: fault injection for reverse engineering
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Masking with randomized look up tables
Cryptography and Security
Efficient removal of random delays from embedded software implementations using hidden markov models
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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Side-Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) is a new field of application for Side-Channel Attacks (SCA), that was recently introduced, following initial results on the GSM A3/A8 algorithm. The principle of SCARE is to use side-channel information (for instance, power consumption) as a tool to reverse-engineer some secret parts of a cryptographic implementation. SCARE has the advantage of being discrete and non-intrusive, so it appears to be a promising new direction of research. In this paper, we apply the concepts of SCARE in the case of the block cipher DES. We measure the power consumption of a software DES executed on a target smart card and propose new methods to exploit this information. We manage to retrieve many details about the underlying device, including some constants used by the algorithm (e.g. permutation tables for the round function and for the key scheduling), but also interesting implementation choices (e.g. registers where subkeys are loaded). Of course some information was already known in our case, but situations can be envisaged where the designer would like to keep it secret. An application of these methods is to reverse-engineer a proprietary algorithm, provided some information about its basic structure is know. Hence it illustrates the power of SCARE and demonstrates yet again the accuracy of Kerckhoff's principle. In addition, a better understanding of a cryptographic implementation can be a first step to mount more sophisticated Side Channel Attacks.