Analysis and design of stream ciphers
Analysis and design of stream ciphers
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Decrypting a Class of Stream Ciphers Using Ciphertext Only
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Fault Attacks on Public Key Elements: Application to DLP-Based Schemes
EuroPKI '08 Proceedings of the 5th European PKI workshop on Public Key Infrastructure: Theory and Practice
On the optimization of side-channel attacks by advanced stochastic methods
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
A tutorial on physical security and side-channel attacks
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
Novel efficient implementations of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems using degenerate divisors
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
A stochastic model for differential side channel cryptanalysis
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Exact analysis of montgomery multiplication
INDOCRYPT'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in India
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Divide and conquer attacks try to recover small portions of cryptographic keys one by one. Usually, a wrong guess makes subsequent ones useless. Hence possible errors should be detected and corrected as soon as possible. In this paper we introduce a new (generic) error detection and correction strategy. Its efficiency is demonstrated at various examples, namely at a power attack, two timing attacks against RSA implementations with and without Chinese Remainder Theorem, and a timing attack against the future AES (Rijndael). As the design of efficient countermeasures requires a good understanding of an attack's actual power, the possible improvement induced by sophisticated error detection and correction should not be neglected. Although divide and conquer attacks are typical for side-channel attacks, we would like to stress that they are not restricted to that field, as will be illustrated by Siegenthaler's attack.