The Design of Rijndael
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Energy-aware design techniques for differential power analysis protection
Proceedings of the 40th annual Design Automation Conference
Instruction Stream Mutation for Non-Deterministic Processors
ASAP '02 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Application-Specific Systems, Architectures, and Processors
Power-Analysis Attack on an ASIC AES implementation
ITCC '04 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'04) Volume 2 - Volume 2
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Protecting AES Software Implementations on 32-Bit Processors Against Power Analysis
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Side Channel Attacks are a major concern in modern security. Two main countermeasure techniques have been studied in order to counteract them: hiding and masking. Hiding techniques try to randomize the obtained traces by adding noise or by swapping instructions of the performed algorithm. In this work, we present a randomization of AES where AES operations can be executed even if previous operations, in the corresponding non-randomized execution of AES, are not finished. We present theoretical and practical results about the distribution of the execution times and show interesting results in comparison to existing techniques. An implementation is available on the author's website.