Differential Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cryptanalysis of a provably secure CRT-RSA algorithm
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On authenticated computing and RSA-based authentication
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Carry Leakage on the Randomized Exponent Countermeasure
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Perturbating RSA Public Keys: An Improved Attack
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Fault Attacks on RSA Public Keys: Left-To-Right Implementations Are Also Vulnerable
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Why one should also secure RSA public key elements
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power attack on small RSA public exponent
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Wagner’s attack on a secure CRT-RSA algorithm reconsidered
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Modulus fault attacks against RSA-CRT signatures
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Defeating with fault injection a combined attack resistant exponentiation
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
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Among all countermeasures that have been proposed to thwart side-channel attacks against RSA implementations, the exponent randomization method - also known as exponent blinding - has been very early suggested by P. Kocher in 1996, and formalized by J.-S. Coron at CHES 1999. Although it has been used for a long time, some authors pointed out the fact that it does not intrinsically remove all sources of leakage. At CHES 2003, P.-A. Fouque and F. Valette devised the so-called "Doubling Attack" that can recover the blinded secret exponent from an SPA analysis. In this paper, we consider the case of fault injections. Although it was conjectured by A. Berzati et al. at CT-RSA 2009 that exponent randomization avoids fault attacks, we describe here how to recover the RSA private key under a practical fault model. Our attack belongs to the family of public key perturbations and is the first fault attack against RSA implementations with the exponent randomization countermeasure. In practice, for a 1024-bit RSA signature algorithms, the attack succeeds from about 1000 faulty signatures.