Fault Attacks on RSA Public Keys: Left-To-Right Implementations Are Also Vulnerable

  • Authors:
  • Alexandre Berzati;Cécile Canovas;Jean-Guillaume Dumas;Louis Goubin

  • Affiliations:
  • CEA-LETI/MINATEC, Grenoble Cedex 9, France 38054 and Versailles Saint-Quentin University, Versailles Cedex, France 78035;CEA-LETI/MINATEC, Grenoble Cedex 9, France 38054;Laboratoire Jean Kuntzmann, umr CNRS 5224, Université de Grenoble, Grenoble, France 38041;Versailles Saint-Quentin University, Versailles Cedex, France 78035

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

After attacking the RSA by injecting fault and corresponding countermeasures, works appear now about the need for protecting RSA public elements against fault attacks. We provide here an extension of a recent attack [BCG08] based on the public modulus corruption. The difficulty to decompose the "Left-To-Right" exponentiation into partial multiplications is overcome by modifying the public modulus to a number with known factorization. This fault model is justified here by a complete study of faulty prime numbers with a fixed size. The good success rate of this attack combined with its practicability raises the question of using faults for changing algebraic properties of finite field based cryptosystems.