A Countermeasure against One Physical Cryptanalysis May Benefit Another Attack
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Breaking Public Key Cryptosystems on Tamper Resistant Devices in the Presence of Transient Faults
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
RSA-type Signatures in the Presence of Transient Faults
Proceedings of the 6th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Cryptanalysis of a provably secure CRT-RSA algorithm
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On authenticated computing and RSA-based authentication
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Why one should also secure RSA public key elements
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Wagner’s attack on a secure CRT-RSA algorithm reconsidered
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
Fault Attacks on RSA Public Keys: Left-To-Right Implementations Are Also Vulnerable
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Public key perturbation of randomized RSA implementations
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
PUF ROKs: a hardware approach to read-once keys
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Modulus fault attacks against RSA-CRT signatures
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Secret key leakage from public key perturbation of DLP-Based cryptosystems
Cryptography and Security
Fault analysis of the NTRUSign digital signature scheme
Cryptography and Communications
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Since its first introduction by Bellcore researchers [BDL97], fault injections have been considered as a powerful and practical way to attack cryptosystems, especially when they are implemented on embedded devices. Among published attacks, Brier et al.followed the work initiated by Seifert to raise the problem of protecting RSA public elements.We describe here a new fault attack on RSA public elements. Under a very natural fault model, we show that our attack is more efficient than previously published ones. Moreover, the general strategy described here can be applied using multiple transient fault models, increasing the practicability of the attack.Both the theoretical analysis of the success probability, and the experimental results --- obtained with the GMP Library on a PC ---, provide evidence that this is a real threat for all RSA implementations, and confirm the need for protection of the public key.