Power attack on small RSA public exponent

  • Authors:
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque;Sébastien Kunz-Jacques;Gwenaëlle Martinet;Frédéric Muller;Frédéric Valette

  • Affiliations:
  • École normale supérieure, Paris, France;École normale supérieure, Paris, France;DCSSI Crypto Lab, Paris 07 SP, France;HSBC, France;CELAR, 35 Bruz, France

  • Venue:
  • CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a new attack on RSA when the public exponent is short, for instance 3 or 216+1, and when the classical exponent randomization is used. This attack works even if blinding is used on the messages. From a Simple Power Analysis (SPA) we study the problem of recovering the RSA private key when non consecutive bits of it leak from the implementation. We also show that such information can be gained from sliding window implementations not protected against SPA.