On the Correctness of an Approach against Side-Channel Attacks

Authors:
Peng Wang;Dengguo Feng;Wenling Wu;Liting Zhang
Affiliations:
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 100049;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institution of Software of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 100080;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institution of Software of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 100080;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institution of Software of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 100080
Venue:
ISPEC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA *** IND *** IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.