Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A VLSI Design Flow for Secure Side-Channel Attack Resistant ICs
Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 3
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
An Efficient Method for Random Delay Generation in Embedded Software
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Mutual Information Analysis: How, When and Why?
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Ways to enhance differential power analysis
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Analysis and improvement of the random delay countermeasure of CHES 2009
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Templates vs. stochastic methods
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A proposition for correlation power analysis enhancement
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Success through confidence: evaluating the effectiveness of a side-channel attack
CHES'13 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems
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Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit weakness in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms, and have emerged as a realistic threat to many critical embedded systems. However, no theoretical model for the widely used differential power analysis (DPA) has revealed exactly what the success rate of DPA depends on and how. This paper proposes a statistical model for DPA that takes characteristics of both the physical implementation and cryptographic algorithm into consideration. Our model establishes a quantitative relation between the success rate of DPA and a cryptographic system. The side-channel characteristic of the physical implementation is modeled as the ratio between the difference-of-means power and the standard deviation of power distribution. The side-channel property of the cryptographic algorithm is extracted by a novel algorithmic confusion analysis. Experimental results on DES and AES verify this model and demonstrate the effectiveness of algorithmic confusion analysis. We expect the model to be extendable to other SCAs, and provide valuable guidelines for truly SCA-resilient system design and implementation.