Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Optimal Randomizer Efficiency in the Bounded-Storage Model
Journal of Cryptology
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2003
Computationally Sound Compositional Logic for Key Exchange Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Proofs of randomized algorithms in Coq
Science of Computer Programming
The Computational SLR: A Logic for Reasoning about Computational Indistinguishability
TLCA '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications
Computational indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Survey: leakage resilience and the bounded retrieval model
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Intrusion-Resilience via the bounded-storage model
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
A computational indistinguishability logic for the bounded storage model
FPS'11 Proceedings of the 4th Canada-France MITACS conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
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Security proofs for cryptographic systems can be carried out in different models which reflect different kinds of security assumptions. In the symbolic model, an attacker cannot guess a secret at all and can only apply a pre-defined set of operations, whereas in the computational model, he can hope to guess secrets and apply any polynomial-time operation. Security properties in the computational model are more difficult to establish and to check. In this paper we present a framework for certified proofs of computational indistinguishability, written using the Coq proof assistant, and based on CIL, a specialized logic for computational frames that can be applied to primitives and protocols. We demonstrate how CIL and its Coq-formalization allow proofs beyond the black-box security framework, where an attacker only uses the input/output relation of the system by executing on chosen inputs without having additional information on the state. More specifically, we use it to prove the security of a protocol against a particular kind of side-channel attack which aims at modeling leakage of information caused by an intrusion into Alice and Bob's computers.