Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Optimal Randomizer Efficiency in the Bounded-Storage Model
Journal of Cryptology
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2003
Computationally Sound Compositional Logic for Key Exchange Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The Computational SLR: A Logic for Reasoning about Computational Indistinguishability
TLCA '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Computational indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Survey: leakage resilience and the bounded retrieval model
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Intrusion-Resilience via the bounded-storage model
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
CPP'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Certified Programs and Proofs
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Side-channel attacks are a major threat for cryptographic mechanisms; yet, they are not considered in the computational model that is used by cryptographers for proving the security of their schemes. As a result, there are several efficient attacks against standardized implementations of provably secure schemes. Leakage resilient cryptography aims to extend provable security so that it can account for side-channels. There are several models of leakage resilient cryptography, from very general models such as physically observable cryptography, to more specialized models that aim to account for a specific form of covert channel. The Bounded Storage model (BSM) is a such a specialized model, which focuses on situations where a virus or a malware program forwards to the attacker some information stolen from the infected computer's memory, for instance some share of a long-term key. We adapt the Computational Indistinguishability Logic to account the BSM, and show how the resulting formalism can be used to verify an existing key exchange protocol in the BSM. Our work provides the first formalism to reason about leakage resilient cryptography.