Flexible exponentiation with resistance to side channel attacks

  • Authors:
  • Camille Vuillaume;Katsuyuki Okeya

  • Affiliations:
  • Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory, Kawasaki, Japan;Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory, Kawasaki, Japan

  • Venue:
  • ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We present a countermeasure for protecting modular exponentiations against side-channel attacks such as power, timing or cache analysis. Our countermeasure is well-suited for tamper-resistant implementations of RSA or DSA, without significant penalty in terms of speed compared to commonly implemented methods. Thanks to its high efficiency and flexibility, our method can be implemented on various platforms, from smartcards with low-end processors to high-performance servers.